commit 4d5b5539742d2554591751b4248b0204d20dcc9d upstream.
Use the 'struct cred' saved at binder_open() to lookup
the security ID via security_cred_getsecid(). This
ensures that the security context that opened binder
is the one used to generate the secctx.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Fixes: ec74136ded79 ("binder: create node flag to request sender's security context")
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change-Id: Ia7b59804a0bdbd51191bbcca556414840307c623
Bug: 200688826
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
commit 52f88693378a58094c538662ba652aff0253c4fe upstream.
Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed
'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc
to represent the source and target of transactions.
The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook
implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions
which can result in an incorrect security context being used.
Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass
it to the selinux subsystem.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables)
Fixes: 79af73079d ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.")
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change-Id: Id7157515d2b08f11683aeb8ad9b8f1da075d34e7
Bug: 200688826
[ tkjos@ fixed minor conflict ]
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Changes in 4.19.164
Kbuild: do not emit debug info for assembly with LLVM_IAS=1
x86/lib: Change .weak to SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK for arch/x86/lib/mem*_64.S
spi: bcm2835aux: Fix use-after-free on unbind
spi: bcm2835aux: Restore err assignment in bcm2835aux_spi_probe
iwlwifi: pcie: limit memory read spin time
arm64: dts: rockchip: Assign a fixed index to mmc devices on rk3399 boards.
iwlwifi: mvm: fix kernel panic in case of assert during CSA
powerpc: Drop -me200 addition to build flags
ARC: stack unwinding: don't assume non-current task is sleeping
scsi: ufs: Make sure clk scaling happens only when HBA is runtime ACTIVE
irqchip/gic-v3-its: Unconditionally save/restore the ITS state on suspend
soc: fsl: dpio: Get the cpumask through cpumask_of(cpu)
platform/x86: thinkpad_acpi: Do not report SW_TABLET_MODE on Yoga 11e
platform/x86: thinkpad_acpi: Add BAT1 is primary battery quirk for Thinkpad Yoga 11e 4th gen
platform/x86: acer-wmi: add automatic keyboard background light toggle key as KEY_LIGHTS_TOGGLE
platform/x86: intel-vbtn: Support for tablet mode on HP Pavilion 13 x360 PC
Input: cm109 - do not stomp on control URB
Input: i8042 - add Acer laptops to the i8042 reset list
pinctrl: amd: remove debounce filter setting in IRQ type setting
mmc: block: Fixup condition for CMD13 polling for RPMB requests
kbuild: avoid static_assert for genksyms
scsi: be2iscsi: Revert "Fix a theoretical leak in beiscsi_create_eqs()"
x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Fix definition of PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP
x86/membarrier: Get rid of a dubious optimization
x86/apic/vector: Fix ordering in vector assignment
compiler.h: fix barrier_data() on clang
PCI: qcom: Add missing reset for ipq806x
mac80211: mesh: fix mesh_pathtbl_init() error path
net: stmmac: free tx skb buffer in stmmac_resume()
tcp: select sane initial rcvq_space.space for big MSS
tcp: fix cwnd-limited bug for TSO deferral where we send nothing
net/mlx4_en: Avoid scheduling restart task if it is already running
lan743x: fix for potential NULL pointer dereference with bare card
net/mlx4_en: Handle TX error CQE
net: stmmac: delete the eee_ctrl_timer after napi disabled
net: stmmac: dwmac-meson8b: fix mask definition of the m250_sel mux
net: bridge: vlan: fix error return code in __vlan_add()
ktest.pl: If size of log is too big to email, email error message
USB: dummy-hcd: Fix uninitialized array use in init()
USB: add RESET_RESUME quirk for Snapscan 1212
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix potential out-of-bounds shift
ALSA: usb-audio: Fix control 'access overflow' errors from chmap
xhci: Give USB2 ports time to enter U3 in bus suspend
USB: UAS: introduce a quirk to set no_write_same
USB: sisusbvga: Make console support depend on BROKEN
ALSA: pcm: oss: Fix potential out-of-bounds shift
serial: 8250_omap: Avoid FIFO corruption caused by MDR1 access
drm/xen-front: Fix misused IS_ERR_OR_NULL checks
drm: fix drm_dp_mst_port refcount leaks in drm_dp_mst_allocate_vcpi
arm64: lse: fix LSE atomics with LLVM's integrated assembler
arm64: lse: Fix LSE atomics with LLVM
arm64: Change .weak to SYM_FUNC_START_WEAK_PI for arch/arm64/lib/mem*.S
x86/resctrl: Remove unused struct mbm_state::chunks_bw
x86/resctrl: Fix incorrect local bandwidth when mba_sc is enabled
pinctrl: merrifield: Set default bias in case no particular value given
pinctrl: baytrail: Avoid clearing debounce value when turning it off
ARM: dts: sun8i: v3s: fix GIC node memory range
gpio: mvebu: fix potential user-after-free on probe
scsi: bnx2i: Requires MMU
xsk: Fix xsk_poll()'s return type
can: softing: softing_netdev_open(): fix error handling
clk: renesas: r9a06g032: Drop __packed for portability
block: factor out requeue handling from dispatch code
netfilter: x_tables: Switch synchronization to RCU
gpio: eic-sprd: break loop when getting NULL device resource
selftests/bpf/test_offload.py: Reset ethtool features after failed setting
RDMA/cm: Fix an attempt to use non-valid pointer when cleaning timewait
ixgbe: avoid premature Rx buffer reuse
drm/tegra: replace idr_init() by idr_init_base()
kernel/cpu: add arch override for clear_tasks_mm_cpumask() mm handling
drm/tegra: sor: Disable clocks on error in tegra_sor_init()
arm64: syscall: exit userspace before unmasking exceptions
vxlan: Add needed_headroom for lower device
vxlan: Copy needed_tailroom from lowerdev
scsi: mpt3sas: Increase IOCInit request timeout to 30s
dm table: Remove BUG_ON(in_interrupt())
soc/tegra: fuse: Fix index bug in get_process_id
USB: serial: option: add interface-number sanity check to flag handling
USB: gadget: f_acm: add support for SuperSpeed Plus
USB: gadget: f_midi: setup SuperSpeed Plus descriptors
usb: gadget: f_fs: Re-use SS descriptors for SuperSpeedPlus
USB: gadget: f_rndis: fix bitrate for SuperSpeed and above
usb: chipidea: ci_hdrc_imx: Pass DISABLE_DEVICE_STREAMING flag to imx6ul
ARM: dts: exynos: fix roles of USB 3.0 ports on Odroid XU
ARM: dts: exynos: fix USB 3.0 VBUS control and over-current pins on Exynos5410
ARM: dts: exynos: fix USB 3.0 pins supply being turned off on Odroid XU
coresight: tmc-etr: Check if page is valid before dma_map_page()
scsi: megaraid_sas: Check user-provided offsets
HID: i2c-hid: add Vero K147 to descriptor override
serial_core: Check for port state when tty is in error state
Bluetooth: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in hci_le_direct_adv_report_evt()
quota: Sanity-check quota file headers on load
media: msi2500: assign SPI bus number dynamically
crypto: af_alg - avoid undefined behavior accessing salg_name
md: fix a warning caused by a race between concurrent md_ioctl()s
perf cs-etm: Change tuple from traceID-CPU# to traceID-metadata
perf cs-etm: Move definition of 'traceid_list' global variable from header file
drm/gma500: fix double free of gma_connector
drm/tve200: Fix handling of platform_get_irq() error
soc: renesas: rmobile-sysc: Fix some leaks in rmobile_init_pm_domains()
soc: mediatek: Check if power domains can be powered on at boot time
soc: qcom: geni: More properly switch to DMA mode
RDMA/bnxt_re: Set queue pair state when being queried
selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()
ARM: dts: aspeed: s2600wf: Fix VGA memory region location
RDMA/rxe: Compute PSN windows correctly
x86/mm/ident_map: Check for errors from ident_pud_init()
ARM: p2v: fix handling of LPAE translation in BE mode
x86/apic: Fix x2apic enablement without interrupt remapping
sched/deadline: Fix sched_dl_global_validate()
sched: Reenable interrupts in do_sched_yield()
crypto: talitos - Endianess in current_desc_hdr()
crypto: talitos - Fix return type of current_desc_hdr()
crypto: inside-secure - Fix sizeof() mismatch
powerpc/64: Set up a kernel stack for secondaries before cpu_restore()
spi: img-spfi: fix reference leak in img_spfi_resume
drm/msm/dsi_pll_10nm: restore VCO rate during restore_state
ASoC: pcm: DRAIN support reactivation
selinux: fix inode_doinit_with_dentry() LABEL_INVALID error handling
arm64: dts: exynos: Include common syscon restart/poweroff for Exynos7
arm64: dts: exynos: Correct psci compatible used on Exynos7
Bluetooth: Fix null pointer dereference in hci_event_packet()
Bluetooth: hci_h5: fix memory leak in h5_close
spi: spi-ti-qspi: fix reference leak in ti_qspi_setup
spi: tegra20-slink: fix reference leak in slink ops of tegra20
spi: tegra20-sflash: fix reference leak in tegra_sflash_resume
spi: tegra114: fix reference leak in tegra spi ops
spi: bcm63xx-hsspi: fix missing clk_disable_unprepare() on error in bcm63xx_hsspi_resume
mwifiex: fix mwifiex_shutdown_sw() causing sw reset failure
ASoC: wm8998: Fix PM disable depth imbalance on error
ASoC: arizona: Fix a wrong free in wm8997_probe
RDMa/mthca: Work around -Wenum-conversion warning
MIPS: BCM47XX: fix kconfig dependency bug for BCM47XX_BCMA
crypto: qat - fix status check in qat_hal_put_rel_rd_xfer()
staging: greybus: codecs: Fix reference counter leak in error handling
staging: gasket: interrupt: fix the missed eventfd_ctx_put() in gasket_interrupt.c
media: tm6000: Fix sizeof() mismatches
media: mtk-vcodec: add missing put_device() call in mtk_vcodec_release_dec_pm()
ASoC: meson: fix COMPILE_TEST error
scsi: core: Fix VPD LUN ID designator priorities
media: solo6x10: fix missing snd_card_free in error handling case
video: fbdev: atmel_lcdfb: fix return error code in atmel_lcdfb_of_init()
drm/omap: dmm_tiler: fix return error code in omap_dmm_probe()
Input: ads7846 - fix race that causes missing releases
Input: ads7846 - fix integer overflow on Rt calculation
Input: ads7846 - fix unaligned access on 7845
usb/max3421: fix return error code in max3421_probe()
spi: mxs: fix reference leak in mxs_spi_probe
powerpc/feature: Fix CPU_FTRS_ALWAYS by removing CPU_FTRS_GENERIC_32
crypto: crypto4xx - Replace bitwise OR with logical OR in crypto4xx_build_pd
crypto: omap-aes - Fix PM disable depth imbalance in omap_aes_probe
spi: fix resource leak for drivers without .remove callback
soc: ti: knav_qmss: fix reference leak in knav_queue_probe
soc: ti: Fix reference imbalance in knav_dma_probe
drivers: soc: ti: knav_qmss_queue: Fix error return code in knav_queue_probe
Input: omap4-keypad - fix runtime PM error handling
RDMA/cxgb4: Validate the number of CQEs
memstick: fix a double-free bug in memstick_check
ARM: dts: at91: sama5d4_xplained: add pincontrol for USB Host
ARM: dts: at91: sama5d3_xplained: add pincontrol for USB Host
orinoco: Move context allocation after processing the skb
cw1200: fix missing destroy_workqueue() on error in cw1200_init_common
dmaengine: mv_xor_v2: Fix error return code in mv_xor_v2_probe()
media: siano: fix memory leak of debugfs members in smsdvb_hotplug
platform/x86: mlx-platform: Remove PSU EEPROM from default platform configuration
platform/x86: mlx-platform: Remove PSU EEPROM from MSN274x platform configuration
samples: bpf: Fix lwt_len_hist reusing previous BPF map
mips: cdmm: fix use-after-free in mips_cdmm_bus_discover
media: max2175: fix max2175_set_csm_mode() error code
slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Avoid sending power requests without QMI
HSI: omap_ssi: Don't jump to free ID in ssi_add_controller()
ARM: dts: Remove non-existent i2c1 from 98dx3236
arm64: dts: rockchip: Set dr_mode to "host" for OTG on rk3328-roc-cc
power: supply: axp288_charger: Fix HP Pavilion x2 10 DMI matching
power: supply: bq24190_charger: fix reference leak
genirq/irqdomain: Don't try to free an interrupt that has no mapping
PCI: Bounds-check command-line resource alignment requests
PCI: Fix overflow in command-line resource alignment requests
PCI: iproc: Fix out-of-bound array accesses
arm64: dts: meson: fix spi-max-frequency on Khadas VIM2
ARM: dts: at91: at91sam9rl: fix ADC triggers
platform/x86: dell-smbios-base: Fix error return code in dell_smbios_init
ath10k: Fix the parsing error in service available event
ath10k: Fix an error handling path
ath10k: Release some resources in an error handling path
NFSv4.2: condition READDIR's mask for security label based on LSM state
SUNRPC: xprt_load_transport() needs to support the netid "rdma6"
lockd: don't use interval-based rebinding over TCP
NFS: switch nfsiod to be an UNBOUND workqueue.
vfio-pci: Use io_remap_pfn_range() for PCI IO memory
media: saa7146: fix array overflow in vidioc_s_audio()
clocksource/drivers/cadence_ttc: Fix memory leak in ttc_setup_clockevent()
ARM: dts: at91: sama5d2: map securam as device
pinctrl: falcon: add missing put_device() call in pinctrl_falcon_probe()
arm64: dts: rockchip: Fix UART pull-ups on rk3328
memstick: r592: Fix error return in r592_probe()
net/mlx5: Properly convey driver version to firmware
ASoC: jz4740-i2s: add missed checks for clk_get()
dm ioctl: fix error return code in target_message
clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Correct fault programming of CNTKCTL_EL1.EVNTI
cpufreq: highbank: Add missing MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE
cpufreq: mediatek: Add missing MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE
cpufreq: st: Add missing MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE
cpufreq: loongson1: Add missing MODULE_ALIAS
cpufreq: scpi: Add missing MODULE_ALIAS
scsi: qedi: Fix missing destroy_workqueue() on error in __qedi_probe
scsi: pm80xx: Fix error return in pm8001_pci_probe()
seq_buf: Avoid type mismatch for seq_buf_init
scsi: fnic: Fix error return code in fnic_probe()
platform/x86: mlx-platform: Fix item counter assignment for MSN2700, MSN24xx systems
powerpc/pseries/hibernation: drop pseries_suspend_begin() from suspend ops
powerpc/pseries/hibernation: remove redundant cacheinfo update
usb: ehci-omap: Fix PM disable depth umbalance in ehci_hcd_omap_probe
usb: oxu210hp-hcd: Fix memory leak in oxu_create
speakup: fix uninitialized flush_lock
nfsd: Fix message level for normal termination
nfs_common: need lock during iterate through the list
x86/kprobes: Restore BTF if the single-stepping is cancelled
bus: fsl-mc: fix error return code in fsl_mc_object_allocate()
clk: tegra: Fix duplicated SE clock entry
extcon: max77693: Fix modalias string
mac80211: don't set set TDLS STA bandwidth wider than possible
ASoC: wm_adsp: remove "ctl" from list on error in wm_adsp_create_control()
irqchip/alpine-msi: Fix freeing of interrupts on allocation error path
watchdog: sirfsoc: Add missing dependency on HAS_IOMEM
watchdog: sprd: remove watchdog disable from resume fail path
watchdog: sprd: check busy bit before new loading rather than after that
watchdog: Fix potential dereferencing of null pointer
um: Monitor error events in IRQ controller
um: tty: Fix handling of close in tty lines
um: chan_xterm: Fix fd leak
nfc: s3fwrn5: Release the nfc firmware
powerpc/ps3: use dma_mapping_error()
checkpatch: fix unescaped left brace
net: bcmgenet: Fix a resource leak in an error handling path in the probe functin
net: allwinner: Fix some resources leak in the error handling path of the probe and in the remove function
net: korina: fix return value
libnvdimm/label: Return -ENXIO for no slot in __blk_label_update
watchdog: qcom: Avoid context switch in restart handler
watchdog: coh901327: add COMMON_CLK dependency
clk: ti: Fix memleak in ti_fapll_synth_setup
pwm: zx: Add missing cleanup in error path
pwm: lp3943: Dynamically allocate PWM chip base
perf record: Fix memory leak when using '--user-regs=?' to list registers
qlcnic: Fix error code in probe
clk: s2mps11: Fix a resource leak in error handling paths in the probe function
clk: sunxi-ng: Make sure divider tables have sentinel
kconfig: fix return value of do_error_if()
ARM: sunxi: Add machine match for the Allwinner V3 SoC
cfg80211: initialize rekey_data
fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
lwt: Disable BH too in run_lwt_bpf()
Input: cros_ec_keyb - send 'scancodes' in addition to key events
Input: goodix - add upside-down quirk for Teclast X98 Pro tablet
media: gspca: Fix memory leak in probe
media: sunxi-cir: ensure IR is handled when it is continuous
media: netup_unidvb: Don't leak SPI master in probe error path
media: ipu3-cio2: Remove traces of returned buffers
media: ipu3-cio2: Return actual subdev format
media: ipu3-cio2: Serialise access to pad format
media: ipu3-cio2: Validate mbus format in setting subdev format
media: ipu3-cio2: Make the field on subdev format V4L2_FIELD_NONE
Input: cyapa_gen6 - fix out-of-bounds stack access
ALSA: hda/ca0132 - Change Input Source enum strings.
PM: ACPI: PCI: Drop acpi_pm_set_bridge_wakeup()
Revert "ACPI / resources: Use AE_CTRL_TERMINATE to terminate resources walks"
ACPI: PNP: compare the string length in the matching_id()
ALSA: hda: Fix regressions on clear and reconfig sysfs
ALSA: hda/realtek - Enable headset mic of ASUS X430UN with ALC256
ALSA: hda/realtek - Enable headset mic of ASUS Q524UQK with ALC255
ALSA: pcm: oss: Fix a few more UBSAN fixes
ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for MSI-GP73
ALSA: hda/realtek: Apply jack fixup for Quanta NL3
ALSA: usb-audio: Add VID to support native DSD reproduction on FiiO devices
ALSA: usb-audio: Disable sample read check if firmware doesn't give back
s390/smp: perform initial CPU reset also for SMT siblings
s390/kexec_file: fix diag308 subcode when loading crash kernel
s390/dasd: fix hanging device offline processing
s390/dasd: prevent inconsistent LCU device data
s390/dasd: fix list corruption of pavgroup group list
s390/dasd: fix list corruption of lcu list
staging: comedi: mf6x4: Fix AI end-of-conversion detection
powerpc/perf: Exclude kernel samples while counting events in user space.
crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()
EDAC/amd64: Fix PCI component registration
USB: serial: mos7720: fix parallel-port state restore
USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix write-wakeup deadlocks
USB: serial: keyspan_pda: fix dropped unthrottle interrupts
USB: serial: keyspan_pda: fix write deadlock
USB: serial: keyspan_pda: fix stalled writes
USB: serial: keyspan_pda: fix write-wakeup use-after-free
USB: serial: keyspan_pda: fix tx-unthrottle use-after-free
USB: serial: keyspan_pda: fix write unthrottling
ext4: fix a memory leak of ext4_free_data
ext4: fix deadlock with fs freezing and EA inodes
KVM: arm64: Introduce handling of AArch32 TTBCR2 traps
ARM: dts: pandaboard: fix pinmux for gpio user button of Pandaboard ES
ARM: dts: at91: sama5d2: fix CAN message ram offset and size
powerpc: Fix incorrect stw{, ux, u, x} instructions in __set_pte_at
powerpc/rtas: Fix typo of ibm,open-errinjct in RTAS filter
powerpc/xmon: Change printk() to pr_cont()
powerpc/powernv/memtrace: Don't leak kernel memory to user space
powerpc/powernv/memtrace: Fix crashing the kernel when enabling concurrently
ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the fly
ceph: fix race in concurrent __ceph_remove_cap invocations
SMB3: avoid confusing warning message on mount to Azure
SMB3.1.1: do not log warning message if server doesn't populate salt
ubifs: wbuf: Don't leak kernel memory to flash
jffs2: Fix GC exit abnormally
jfs: Fix array index bounds check in dbAdjTree
drm/dp_aux_dev: check aux_dev before use in drm_dp_aux_dev_get_by_minor()
spi: spi-sh: Fix use-after-free on unbind
spi: davinci: Fix use-after-free on unbind
spi: pic32: Don't leak DMA channels in probe error path
spi: rb4xx: Don't leak SPI master in probe error path
spi: sc18is602: Don't leak SPI master in probe error path
spi: st-ssc4: Fix unbalanced pm_runtime_disable() in probe error path
spi: mt7621: fix missing clk_disable_unprepare() on error in mt7621_spi_probe
soc: qcom: smp2p: Safely acquire spinlock without IRQs
mtd: spinand: Fix OOB read
mtd: parser: cmdline: Fix parsing of part-names with colons
mtd: rawnand: qcom: Fix DMA sync on FLASH_STATUS register read
scsi: lpfc: Fix invalid sleeping context in lpfc_sli4_nvmet_alloc()
scsi: lpfc: Re-fix use after free in lpfc_rq_buf_free()
iio: buffer: Fix demux update
iio: adc: rockchip_saradc: fix missing clk_disable_unprepare() on error in rockchip_saradc_resume
iio:light:rpr0521: Fix timestamp alignment and prevent data leak.
iio:light:st_uvis25: Fix timestamp alignment and prevent data leak.
iio:pressure:mpl3115: Force alignment of buffer
iio:imu:bmi160: Fix too large a buffer.
md/cluster: block reshape with remote resync job
md/cluster: fix deadlock when node is doing resync job
pinctrl: sunxi: Always call chained_irq_{enter, exit} in sunxi_pinctrl_irq_handler
clk: mvebu: a3700: fix the XTAL MODE pin to MPP1_9
xen-blkback: set ring->xenblkd to NULL after kthread_stop()
xen/xenbus: Allow watches discard events before queueing
xen/xenbus: Add 'will_handle' callback support in xenbus_watch_path()
xen/xenbus/xen_bus_type: Support will_handle watch callback
xen/xenbus: Count pending messages for each watch
xenbus/xenbus_backend: Disallow pending watch messages
libnvdimm/namespace: Fix reaping of invalidated block-window-namespace labels
platform/x86: intel-vbtn: Allow switch events on Acer Switch Alpha 12
PCI: Fix pci_slot_release() NULL pointer dereference
platform/x86: mlx-platform: remove an unused variable
Linux 4.19.164
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: I8e2d24b45393ee2360186893d4e578e20156c7f1
[ Upstream commit ed9b25d1970a4787ac6a39c2091e63b127ecbfc1 ]
Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1d .
When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a
virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is
in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid.
The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked
up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original
xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one.
To test this using libcap-bin (*1),
$ v=$(mktemp)
$ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v
$ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v
/tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK
"setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and
will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with
this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will
fail:
$ v=$(mktemp)
$ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v
$ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v
nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in []
Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in
security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning
-EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n.
*1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n'
option, then use verify-caps instead.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209689
Cc: Hervé Guillemet <herve@guillemet.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <shallyn@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c1a85a00ea66cb6f0bd0f14e47c28c2b0999799f ]
This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the
security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is
used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for
the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag
passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether
security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by
the proposed SafeSetID LSM).
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system
call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of
limitations:
1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled
based on the single value thus making the control very limited and
coarse grained.
2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means
all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to
security issues.
This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in
Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF
programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from
userspace. These operations are intended for production systems.
5 new LSM hooks are added:
1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2)
syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the
perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the
systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU,
kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and
tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl).
Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to
perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other
distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016.
2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event
which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when
the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may
try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access.
3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed.
4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event.
5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/
Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his
Suggested-by tag below.
To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then
apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then
add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future
we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: jeffv@google.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: primiano@google.com
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: rsavitski@google.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
(cherry picked from commit da97e18458fb42d7c00fac5fd1c56a3896ec666e)
[ Ryan Savitski: Resolved conflicts with existing code, and folded in
upstream ae79d5588a04 (perf/core: Fix !CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS build
warnings and failures). This should fix the build errors from the
previous backport attempt, where certain configurations would end up
with functions referring to the perf_event struct prior to its
declaration (and therefore declaring it with a different scope). ]
Bug: 137092007
Signed-off-by: Ryan Savitski <rsavitski@google.com>
Change-Id: Ief8c669083c81f4ea2fa75d5c0d947d19ea741b3
In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system
call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of
limitations:
1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled
based on the single value thus making the control very limited and
coarse grained.
2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means
all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to
security issues.
This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in
Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF
programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from
userspace. These operations are intended for production systems.
5 new LSM hooks are added:
1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2)
syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the
perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the
systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU,
kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and
tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl).
Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to
perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other
distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016.
2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event
which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when
the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may
try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access.
3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed.
4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event.
5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/
Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his
Suggested-by tag below.
To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then
apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then
add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future
we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: jeffv@google.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: primiano@google.com
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: rsavitski@google.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
Bug: 137092007
Change-Id: I591c6ad6c82ab9133409e51383d2c9b9f6ae4545
(cherry picked from commit da97e18458fb42d7c00fac5fd1c56a3896ec666e)
[ Ryan Savitski:
Resolved conflicts with existing code, no new functionality ]
Signed-off-by: Ryan Savitski <rsavitski@google.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- kstrdup() return value fix from Eric Biggers
- Add new security_load_data hook to differentiate security checking of
kernel-loaded binaries in the case of there being no associated file
descriptor, from Mimi Zohar.
- Add ability to IMA to specify a policy at build-time, rather than
just via command line params or by loading a custom policy, from
Mimi.
- Allow IMA and LSMs to prevent sysfs firmware load fallback (e.g. if
using signed firmware), from Mimi.
- Allow IMA to deny loading of kexec kernel images, as they cannot be
measured by IMA, from Mimi.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append()
security: export security_kernel_load_data function
ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)
module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module
ima: add build time policy
ima: based on policy require signed firmware (sysfs fallback)
firmware: add call to LSM hook before firmware sysfs fallback
ima: based on policy require signed kexec kernel images
kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall
security: define new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data
MAINTAINERS: remove the outdated "LINUX SECURITY MODULE (LSM) FRAMEWORK" entry
Right now the LSM labels for socketpairs are always uninitialized,
since there is no security hook for the socketpair() syscall. This
patch adds the required hooks so LSMs can properly label socketpairs.
This allows SO_PEERSEC to return useful information on those sockets.
Note that the behavior of socketpair() can be emulated by creating a
listener socket, connecting to it, and then discarding the initial
listener socket. With this workaround, SO_PEERSEC would return the
caller's security context. However, with socketpair(), the uninitialized
context is returned unconditionally. This is unexpected and makes
socketpair() less useful in situations where the security context is
crucial to the application.
With the new socketpair-hook this disparity can be solved by making
socketpair() return the expected security context.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no>
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
security_settime was a wrapper around security_settime64. There are no more
users of it. Therefore it can be removed. It was removed in:
commit 4eb1bca179 ("time: Use do_settimeofday64() internally")
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"A mixture of bug fixes, code cleanup, and continues to close
IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal, and IMA-audit gaps.
Also note the addition of a new cred_getsecid LSM hook by Matthew
Garrett:
For IMA purposes, we want to be able to obtain the prepared secid
in the bprm structure before the credentials are committed. Add a
cred_getsecid hook that makes this possible.
which is used by a new CREDS_CHECK target in IMA:
In ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process
credentials and the credentials that will be committed when the new
process is started. This will not change behaviour unless the
system policy is extended to include CREDS_CHECK targets -
BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same credentials that it did
previously"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm
ima: Add smackfs to the default appraise/measure list
evm: check for remount ro in progress before writing
ima: Improvements in ima_appraise_measurement()
ima: Simplify ima_eventsig_init()
integrity: Remove unused macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS
ima: drop vla in ima_audit_measurement()
ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interface
evm: Constify *integrity_status_msg[]
evm: Move evm_hmac and evm_hash from evm_main.c to evm_crypto.c
fuse: define the filesystem as untrusted
ima: fail signature verification based on policy
ima: clear IMA_HASH
ima: re-evaluate files on privileged mounted filesystems
ima: fail file signature verification on non-init mounted filesystems
IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
security: Add a cred_getsecid hook
Pull general security layer updates from James Morris:
- Convert security hooks from list to hlist, a nice cleanup, saving
about 50% of space, from Sargun Dhillon.
- Only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and
security_task_kill (as the secid can be determined from the cred),
from Stephen Smalley.
- Close a potential race in kernel_read_file(), by making the file
unwritable before calling the LSM check (vs after), from Kees Cook.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: convert security hooks to use hlist
exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check
usb, signal, security: only pass the cred, not the secid, to kill_pid_info_as_cred and security_task_kill
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A bigger than usual pull request for SELinux, 13 patches (lucky!)
along with a scary looking diffstat.
Although if you look a bit closer, excluding the usual minor
tweaks/fixes, there are really only two significant changes in this
pull request: the addition of proper SELinux access controls for SCTP
and the encapsulation of a lot of internal SELinux state.
The SCTP changes are the result of a multi-month effort (maybe even a
year or longer?) between the SELinux folks and the SCTP folks to add
proper SELinux controls. A special thanks go to Richard for seeing
this through and keeping the effort moving forward.
The state encapsulation work is a bit of janitorial work that came out
of some early work on SELinux namespacing. The question of namespacing
is still an open one, but I believe there is some real value in the
encapsulation work so we've split that out and are now sending that up
to you"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20180403' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: wrap AVC state
selinux: wrap selinuxfs state
selinux: fix handling of uninitialized selinux state in get_bools/classes
selinux: Update SELinux SCTP documentation
selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure
selinux: rename the {is,set}_enforcing() functions
selinux: wrap global selinux state
selinux: fix typo in selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone declaration
selinux: Add SCTP support
sctp: Add LSM hooks
sctp: Add ip option support
security: Add support for SCTP security hooks
netlabel: If PF_INET6, check sk_buff ip header version
All of the implementations of security hooks that take msg_queue only
access q_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the
dependencies of the msg_queue security hooks can be simplified by
passing the kern_ipc_perm member of msg_queue.
Making this change will allow struct msg_queue to become private to
ipc/msg.c.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
All of the implementations of security hooks that take shmid_kernel only
access shm_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the
dependencies of the shm security hooks can be simplified by passing
the kern_ipc_perm member of shmid_kernel..
Making this change will allow struct shmid_kernel to become private to ipc/shm.c.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
All of the implementations of security hooks that take sem_array only
access sem_perm the struct kern_ipc_perm member. This means the
dependencies of the sem security hooks can be simplified by passing
the kern_ipc_perm member of sem_array.
Making this change will allow struct sem and struct sem_array
to become private to ipc/sem.c.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
commit d178bc3a70 ("user namespace: usb:
make usb urbs user namespace aware (v2)") changed kill_pid_info_as_uid
to kill_pid_info_as_cred, saving and passing a cred structure instead of
uids. Since the secid can be obtained from the cred, drop the secid fields
from the usb_dev_state and async structures, and drop the secid argument to
kill_pid_info_as_cred. Replace the secid argument to security_task_kill
with the cred. Update SELinux, Smack, and AppArmor to use the cred, which
avoids the need for Smack and AppArmor to use a secid at all in this hook.
Further changes to Smack might still be required to take full advantage of
this change, since it should now be possible to perform capability
checking based on the supplied cred. The changes to Smack and AppArmor
have only been compile-tested.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Touching linux/bpf.h makes us rebuild a surprisingly large
portion of the kernel. Remove the unnecessary dependency
from security.h, it only needs forward declarations.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Monnet <quentin.monnet@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the
userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps.
The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection
for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can
read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides
that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf
syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The
actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and
how the cmd should be checked.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A relatively quiet period for SELinux, 11 patches with only two/three
having any substantive changes.
These noteworthy changes include another tweak to the NNP/nosuid
handling, per-file labeling for cgroups, and an object class fix for
AF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets; the rest of the changes are minor tweaks or
administrative updates (Stephen's email update explains the file
explosion in the diffstat).
Everything passes the selinux-testsuite"
[ Also a couple of small patches from the security tree from Tetsuo
Handa for Tomoyo and LSM cleanup. The separation of security policy
updates wasn't all that clean - Linus ]
* tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: constify nf_hook_ops
selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs
lsm_audit: update my email address
selinux: update my email address
MAINTAINERS: update the NetLabel and Labeled Networking information
selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches
selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitions
selinux: genheaders should fail if too many permissions are defined
selinux: update the selinux info in MAINTAINERS
credits: update Paul Moore's info
selinux: Assign proper class to PF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets
tomoyo: Update URLs in Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/tomoyo.rst
LSM: Remove security_task_create() hook.
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"Life has been busy and I have not gotten half as much done this round
as I would have liked. I delayed it so that a minor conflict
resolution with the mips tree could spend a little time in linux-next
before I sent this pull request.
This includes two long delayed user namespace changes from Kirill
Tkhai. It also includes a very useful change from Serge Hallyn that
allows the security capability attribute to be used inside of user
namespaces. The practical effect of this is people can now untar
tarballs and install rpms in user namespaces. It had been suggested to
generalize this and encode some of the namespace information
information in the xattr name. Upon close inspection that makes the
things that should be hard easy and the things that should be easy
more expensive.
Then there is my bugfix/cleanup for signal injection that removes the
magic encoding of the siginfo union member from the kernel internal
si_code. The mips folks reported the case where I had used FPE_FIXME
me is impossible so I have remove FPE_FIXME from mips, while at the
same time including a return statement in that case to keep gcc from
complaining about unitialized variables.
I almost finished the work to get make copy_siginfo_to_user a trivial
copy to user. The code is available at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git neuter-copy_siginfo_to_user-v3
But I did not have time/energy to get the code posted and reviewed
before the merge window opened.
I was able to see that the security excuse for just copying fields
that we know are initialized doesn't work in practice there are buggy
initializations that don't initialize the proper fields in siginfo. So
we still sometimes copy unitialized data to userspace"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
mips/signal: In force_fcr31_sig return in the impossible case
signal: Remove kernel interal si_code magic
fcntl: Don't use ambiguous SIG_POLL si_codes
prctl: Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file
security: Use user_namespace::level to avoid redundant iterations in cap_capable()
userns,pidns: Verify the userns for new pid namespaces
signal/testing: Don't look for __SI_FAULT in userspace
signal/mips: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/sparc: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/ia64: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
signal/alpha: Document a conflict with SI_USER for SIGTRAP
Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
host.
However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a
vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct
vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (that is, the uid_t in user
namespace which mounted the filesystem, usually init_user_ns) of the
root id in whose namespaces the file capabilities may take effect.
When a task asks to write a v2 security.capability xattr, if it is
privileged with respect to the userns which mounted the filesystem, then
nothing should change. Otherwise, the kernel will transparently rewrite
the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid. This is done during the
execution of setxattr() to catch user-space-initiated capability writes.
Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as
its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns,
will run the file with capabilities.
Similarly when asking to read file capabilities, a v3 capability will
be presented as v2 if it applies to the caller's namespace.
If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a uid for
the xattr so long as the uid is valid in its own user namespace, and it
is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP over its namespace. The kernel will
translate that rootid to an absolute uid, and write that to disk. After
this, a task in the writer's namespace will not be able to use those
capabilities (unless rootid was 0), but a task in a namespace where the
given uid is root will.
Only a single security.capability xattr may exist at a time for a given
file. A task may overwrite an existing xattr so long as it is
privileged over the inode. Note this is a departure from previous
semantics, which required privilege to remove a security.capability
xattr. This check can be re-added if deemed useful.
This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and
allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving
the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent
namespace.
Example using tar:
$ cp /bin/sleep sleepx
$ mkdir b1 b2
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b1
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b2
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -cf b1/sleepx.tar sleepx
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -C b2 -xf b1/sleepx.tar
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- getcap b2/sleepx
b2/sleepx = cap_sys_admin+ep
# /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/getv3xattr b2/sleepx
v3 xattr, rootid is 100001
A patch to linux-test-project adding a new set of tests for this
functionality is in the nsfscaps branch at github.com/hallyn/ltp
Changelog:
Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite()
Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns
(From ebiederm: mar 28 2017)
commoncap.c: fix typos - s/v4/v3
get_vfs_caps_from_disk: clarify the fs_ns root access check
nsfscaps: change the code split for cap_inode_setxattr()
Apr 09 2017:
don't return v3 cap for caps owned by current root.
return a v2 cap for a true v2 cap in non-init ns
Apr 18 2017:
. Change the flow of fscap writing to support s_user_ns writing.
. Remove refuse_fcap_overwrite(). The value of the previous
xattr doesn't matter.
Apr 24 2017:
. incorporate Eric's incremental diff
. move cap_convert_nscap to setxattr and simplify its usage
May 8, 2017:
. fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The commoncap implementation of the bprm_secureexec hook is the only LSM
that depends on the final call to its bprm_set_creds hook (since it may
be called for multiple files, it ignores bprm->called_set_creds). As a
result, it cannot safely _clear_ bprm->secureexec since other LSMs may
have set it. Instead, remove the bprm_secureexec hook by introducing a
new flag to bprm specific to commoncap: cap_elevated. This is similar to
cap_effective, but that is used for a specific subset of elevated
privileges, and exists solely to track state from bprm_set_creds to
bprm_secureexec. As such, it will be removed in the next patch.
Here, set the new bprm->cap_elevated flag when setuid/setgid has happened
from bprm_fill_uid() or fscapabilities have been prepared. This temporarily
moves the bprm_secureexec hook to a static inline. The helper will be
removed in the next patch; this makes the step easier to review and bisect,
since this does not introduce any changes to inputs nor outputs to the
"elevated privileges" calculation.
The new flag is merged with the bprm->secureexec flag in setup_new_exec()
since this marks the end of any further prepare_binprm() calls.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
When an NFSv4 client performs a mount operation, it first mounts the
NFSv4 root and then does path walk to the exported path and performs a
submount on that, cloning the security mount options from the root's
superblock to the submount's superblock in the process.
Unless the NFS server has an explicit fsid=0 export with the
"security_label" option, the NFSv4 root superblock will not have
SBLABEL_MNT set, and neither will the submount superblock after cloning
the security mount options. As a result, setxattr's of security labels
over NFSv4.2 will fail. In a similar fashion, NFSv4.2 mounts mounted
with the context= mount option will not show the correct labels because
the nfs_server->caps flags of the cloned superblock will still have
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL set.
Allowing the NFSv4 client to enable or disable SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
behavior will ensure that the SBLABEL_MNT flag has the correct value
when the client traverses from an exported path without the
"security_label" option to one with the "security_label" option and
vice versa. Similarly, checking to see if SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS is
set upon return from security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() and clearing
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL if necessary will allow the correct labels to
be displayed for NFSv4.2 mounts mounted with the context= mount option.
Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/35
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a MAD
agent. This context is used for controlling access to PKeys and sending
and receiving SMPs.
When sending or receiving a MAD check that the agent has permission to
access the PKey for the Subnet Prefix of the port.
During MAD and snoop agent registration for SMI QPs check that the
calling process has permission to access the manage the subnet and
register a callback with the LSM to be notified of policy changes. When
notificaiton of a policy change occurs recheck permission and set a flag
indicating sending and receiving SMPs is allowed.
When sending and receiving MADs check that the agent has access to the
SMI if it's on an SMI QP. Because security policy can change it's
possible permission was allowed when creating the agent, but no longer
is.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
[PM: remove the LSM hook init code]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a generic notificaiton mechanism in the LSM. Interested consumers
can register a callback with the LSM and security modules can produce
events.
Because access to Infiniband QPs are enforced in the setup phase of a
connection security should be enforced again if the policy changes.
Register infiniband devices for policy change notification and check all
QPs on that device when the notification is received.
Add a call to the notification mechanism from SELinux when the AVC
cache changes or setenforce is cleared.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add new LSM hooks to allocate and free security contexts and check for
permission to access a PKey.
Allocate and free a security context when creating and destroying a QP.
This context is used for controlling access to PKeys.
When a request is made to modify a QP that changes the port, PKey index,
or alternate path, check that the QP has permission for the PKey in the
PKey table index on the subnet prefix of the port. If the QP is shared
make sure all handles to the QP also have access.
Store which port and PKey index a QP is using. After the reset to init
transition the user can modify the port, PKey index and alternate path
independently. So port and PKey settings changes can be a merge of the
previous settings and the new ones.
In order to maintain access control if there are PKey table or subnet
prefix change keep a list of all QPs are using each PKey index on
each port. If a change occurs all QPs using that device and port must
have access enforced for the new cache settings.
These changes add a transaction to the QP modify process. Association
with the old port and PKey index must be maintained if the modify fails,
and must be removed if it succeeds. Association with the new port and
PKey index must be established prior to the modify and removed if the
modify fails.
1. When a QP is modified to a particular Port, PKey index or alternate
path insert that QP into the appropriate lists.
2. Check permission to access the new settings.
3. If step 2 grants access attempt to modify the QP.
4a. If steps 2 and 3 succeed remove any prior associations.
4b. If ether fails remove the new setting associations.
If a PKey table or subnet prefix changes walk the list of QPs and
check that they have permission. If not send the QP to the error state
and raise a fatal error event. If it's a shared QP make sure all the
QPs that share the real_qp have permission as well. If the QP that
owns a security structure is denied access the security structure is
marked as such and the QP is added to an error_list. Once the moving
the QP to error is complete the security structure mark is cleared.
Maintaining the lists correctly turns QP destroy into a transaction.
The hardware driver for the device frees the ib_qp structure, so while
the destroy is in progress the ib_qp pointer in the ib_qp_security
struct is undefined. When the destroy process begins the ib_qp_security
structure is marked as destroying. This prevents any action from being
taken on the QP pointer. After the QP is destroyed successfully it
could still listed on an error_list wait for it to be processed by that
flow before cleaning up the structure.
If the destroy fails the QPs port and PKey settings are reinserted into
the appropriate lists, the destroying flag is cleared, and access control
is enforced, in case there were any cache changes during the destroy
flow.
To keep the security changes isolated a new file is used to hold security
related functionality.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fixup in ib_verbs.h and uverbs_cmd.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security
in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change.
TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct"
security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct
task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another
example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred
a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although
security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module
wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob,
security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were
not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules
which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob.
We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully
armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks
like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of
lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive
hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not
implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will
become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"->
security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length
"struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
Acked-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
"There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user
visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will
care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show
up.
From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs
ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes
prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem,
but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops.
Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long
standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only
children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not
children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl
systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace
regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same
rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough
to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature.
There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify
instances inside a user namespace.
Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate
namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the
hierachy and properties of namespaces.
Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a
network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As
in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory.
Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions
on the wrong inode were being checked.
I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to
be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough
credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID
in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable
executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their
mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work
better.
A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now
fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates
as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget
to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission
check happened when the original filesystem was mounted.
Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing
unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics
simpler which benefits CRIU.
The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us
ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the
fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing
how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem
fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem
uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock.
vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid()
proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering
mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
introduce the walk_process_tree() helper
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns
fs: Better permission checking for submounts
exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction
vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids
nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type
proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces
exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP
exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps
exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID
inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits
With previous changes every location that tests for
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP also tests for LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE making the
LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP redundant, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait()
can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects
sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can
in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically
reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove
the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack
already removed its check from its hook.
Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Processes can only alter their own security attributes via
/proc/pid/attr nodes. This is presently enforced by each individual
security module and is also imposed by the Linux credentials
implementation, which only allows a task to alter its own credentials.
Move the check enforcing this restriction from the individual
security modules to proc_pid_attr_write() before calling the security hook,
and drop the unnecessary task argument to the security hook since it can
only ever be the current task.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
During a new file creation we need to make sure new file is created with the
right label. New file is created in upper/ so effectively file should get
label as if task had created file in upper/.
We switched to mounter's creds for actual file creation. Also if there is a
whiteout present, then file will be created in work/ dir first and then
renamed in upper. In none of the cases file will be labeled as we want it to
be.
This patch introduces a new hook dentry_create_files_as(), which determines
the label/context dentry will get if it had been created by task in upper
and modify passed set of creds appropriately. Caller makes use of these new
creds for file creation.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: fix whitespace issues found with checkpatch.pl]
[PM: changes to use stat->mode in ovl_create_or_link()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Provide a security hook which is called when xattrs of a file are being
copied up. This hook is called once for each xattr and LSM can return
0 if the security module wants the xattr to be copied up, 1 if the
security module wants the xattr to be discarded on the copy, -EOPNOTSUPP
if the security module does not handle/manage the xattr, or a -errno
upon an error.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: whitespace cleanup for checkpatch.pl]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Provide a security hook to label new file correctly when a file is copied
up from lower layer to upper layer of a overlay/union mount.
This hook can prepare a new set of creds which are suitable for new file
creation during copy up. Caller will use new creds to create file and then
revert back to old creds and release new creds.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: whitespace cleanup to appease checkpatch.pl]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
