ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()

commit e0da8a8cac74f4b9f577979d131f0d2b88a84487 upstream.

snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names() advances pointer p through the names
buffer while decrementing buf_len. If buf_len reaches zero but items
remain, the next iteration calls strnlen(p, 0).

While strnlen(p, 0) returns 0 and would hit the existing name_len == 0
error path, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE's fortified strnlen() first checks
maxlen against __builtin_dynamic_object_size(). When Clang loses track
of p's object size inside the loop, this triggers a BRK exception panic
before the return value is examined.

Add a buf_len == 0 guard at the loop entry to prevent calling fortified
strnlen() on an exhausted buffer.

Found by kernel fuzz testing through Xiaomi Smartphone.

Fixes: 8d448162bd ("ALSA: control: add support for ENUMERATED user space controls")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ziqing Chen <chenziqing@xiaomi.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260414132437.261304-1-chenziqing@xiaomi.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Hecht <uli@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Ziqing Chen
2026-04-14 21:24:37 +08:00
committed by Ulrich Hecht
parent 97280fe904
commit 39bfa59760

View File

@ -1214,6 +1214,10 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names(struct user_element *ue)
buf_len = ue->info.value.enumerated.names_length;
p = names;
for (i = 0; i < ue->info.value.enumerated.items; ++i) {
if (buf_len == 0) {
kvfree(names);
return -EINVAL;
}
name_len = strnlen(p, buf_len);
if (name_len == 0 || name_len >= 64 || name_len == buf_len) {
kvfree(names);